Les auteurs se penchent sur différentes hypothèses susceptibles d'expliquer la faible pénétration de l'assurance soins de longue durée sur le marché canadien. Leur analyse s'appuie sur les résultats d'une enquête menée à l'automne 2016 auprès de 2 000 Canadiens âgés de 50 à 70 ans. Une proportion considérable de personnes appartenant à cette tranche d'âge ont déclaré que jamais l'acquisition de ce genre de protection ne leur avait été proposée. Les répondants qui ont indiqué avoir une assurance soins de longue durée ne différaient pas des répondants non assurés quant à la perception du risque ou à l'état de santé, mais ils étaient plus nombreux à bénéfi cier d'un régime de retraite offert par l'employeur et, lorsque leur salaire était faible, à être sensibles aux motifs patrimoniaux. Les auteurs concluent que les facteurs liés à l'offre, y compris l'évincement par les programmes gouvernementaux, sont ceux qui expliquent le plus vraisemblablement pourquoi la proportion de Canadiens qui se dotent d'assurance soins de longue durée privée est si faible.
Introduction

Motivation
The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company of Canada, commonly known as Manulife and operating in the United States under the name John Hancock, is one of Canada's largest providers of life and health insurance. It announced in late 2017 that it would discontinue the sale of long-term-care (LTC) insurance in Canada by the end of that calendar year. Reasons stated for doing so were the limited market acceptance of such a product and new federal laws restricting insurer access to medical information. Manulife's presence in this market lasted barely 10 years. In November 2007, a Manulife offi cial was quoted as saying that "Canada's aging population, increased life expectancy and need for elder care all suggest Canadians should account for long-term care costs when they are planning for retirement" (McCaffery 2017) . Although the Manulife offi cial uttered those words in 2007, it is very likely that many other insurance and government offi cials could have uttered the same words in 2017; even the OECD (2011 ) recognizes that one of the biggest challenges of the aging modern society is to devise a system that responds to the greater need for LTC services.
LTC is defi ned as care for elderly individuals provided over a prolonged period of time. This care is provided in the form of support with activities of daily living (ADLs; such as bathing, dressing, eating, getting in and out of bed, grooming, and continence) and instrumental activities of daily living (which include preparing meals, cleaning, doing the laundry, taking medication, getting to places beyond walking distance, shopping, managing money, and using the telephone or the Internet). LTC is related to the loss of autonomy brought on by old age and should be distinguished from that related to illness, disability, and handicap.
1 As such, LTC insurance is not the same as disability insurance: The latter is designed for the working-age population, whereas the former targets the retired or soon-to-be-retired population. LTC services are only one of many aspects of the increasingly important problems that all rich countries must face with respect to the provision of services to the growing population of elderly people. Great advances have been made in the provision of health services and retirement income to elderly individuals, 2 yet the great majority of rich countries are still looking for the best way to fi nance the cost of providing LTC services. How to fi nance LTC services is therefore becoming an increasingly important problem.
According to the OECD (2011 ), the population aged 80 years and older is expected to represent 10 percent of the developed world's population by 2050. That age bracket, which represented only 4 percent of the developed world's total population in 2010, is the fastest growing one in the developed world. The challenge for the provision and fi nancing of LTC services rests in the possibility that the number of years during which LTC services are needed increases as the population grows older but not healthier or that the types of services needed, sought, or covered by the public system or insurers will change in the future.
Previous Results
A decade ago, Brown and Finkelstein (2009 ) estimated that between 35 percent and 50 percent of 65-year-old Americans will be in need of a nursing home at some point. Of those, 10-20 percent will need LTC services for fi ve years or more. Nothing suggests that these numbers have gone down, as Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder (2013 ) propose that between 53 percent and 59 percent of 50-year-old individuals will need LTC services. Having to pay for LTC represents a potentially catastrophic fi nancial event for middle-income households, especially for those who will need LTC for fi ve years or more. Canada, like other OECD countries, will not escape that trend. The CLHIA (2012 ) projected that over the next 30 years, LTC expenses will amount to C$1.2 trillion, half of which has not yet been budgeted. If, say, one-third of this is paid by individuals, it would amount to C$6.5 billion in out-of-pocket expenses each year for nursing home services.
Despite LTC having many risk characteristics similar to that of catastrophes (i.e., relatively low annual probability of needing LTC but high overall severity), which should be suffi cient for an insurance market to thrive, LTC insurance penetration is quite low, with less than 15 percent of any rich country's population having some form of private LTC insurance. This low coverage phenomenon is known as the "LTC insurance puzzle." 3 Many hypotheses have been formulated to explain the lack of a market for LTC insurance. These hypotheses can be grouped into two categories: demand-side considerations, including risk misperceptions, and supply-side considerations, including government crowding out.
Supply-side explanations for the lack of a LTC insurance market can also be divided into two: the cost of underwriting, including the cost of asymmetric information and lapse risk, and the crowding out of the private market caused by government programs. Some studies (see the references in Finkelstein 2008 , 2009 ) argue that private LTC insurance contracts are expensive because of important loading factors. Brown and Finkelstein (2007 ) show, however, that loads on LTC insurance are not particularly high-at least not so high as to lead rich retirees to prefer using their private savings as a form of self-insurance rather than purchasing LTC insurance.
Other studies ( Sloan and Norton 1997 ) point to the existence of important asymmetric information problems (both moral hazard and adverse selection) that induce insurers to restrict coverage. 4 In addition to these ex ante information asymmetry problems, Cutler (1996 ) proposes that the low market penetration of LTC insurance is due to insurers' inability to properly forecast the average cost of insured services. In addition, as individuals learn more about their health condition over time, good risks let their LTC insurance contract lapse, whereas bad risks remain in the pool. In other words, insurers shy away from LTC risk that has, in the long run, too much uncertainty regarding not only the cost of providing services but also the composition of the risk pool.
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As for government programs, Brown and Finkelstein (2008 ) show that social insurance, and in particular Medicaid in the United States, crowds out the demand for private insurance (see Veall 1986 on the impact of government programs on private savings). While acknowledging that the public provision of health services late in life can explain the lack of insurance, Boyer and Glenzer (2016 ) propose that retirement programs (such as Canada's Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement, the Canada Pension Plan, la Régie des rentes du Québec, or Social Security in the United States) also reduce the need for LTC insurance while exacerbating adverse selection problems.
Demand-side explanations, which are more numerous than supply-side explanations-likely because more data are available from individuals than from insurers-can be categorized on the basis of whether they originate from the agents' utility function or from the agents' probability of needing LTC. The fi rst demand-side explanation for the low LTC insurance penetration observed in any country is related to the importance of informal care or family support. Many studies have documented the importance of informal family help; there is now a consensus (see, e.g., Bonsang 2007 Bonsang , 2009 Charles and Sevak 2005 ; Van Houtven and Norton 2004 ) on the substitutability of formal and informal help. A report from the OECD (2011 ) highlights the fact that family caretakers are primarily women, in particular (younger) spouses, adult daughters, and daughters-in-law. Access to family support explains part of the lack of LTC insurance because it is relatively easy to ask for help from family members. Informal help consists of children devoting time to help their elderly parents, sharing their house or apartment with them, or moving back in with an elderly parent who is unwilling to leave his or her home ( Pinquart and Sorensen 2002 ) . 6 A second demand-side reason is related to the population's low level of fi nancial literacy (see Boisclair, Lusardi, and Michaud 2015 ; Lusardi and Mitchell 2014 ) and to individuals' lack of knowledge about the true costs and benefi ts of LTC services and insurance. In contrast to the large body of research on the population's lack of basic fi nancial knowledge (see Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell 2017 and the references therein), especially with respect to savings decisions and retirement planning, there is not much evidence about whether agents have any knowledge of the true costs associated with dependency.
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The third demand-side reason explaining the low LTC insurance take-up is older individuals' reluctance to leave their homes. Davido (2009 ) considers housing (and the sharing of it) as a substitute for LTC insurance. Because elderly individuals should prefer to de-cumulate house equity rather than buying insurance in anticipation of potentially needing LTC services, 8 wealthier individuals should be more willing to bequeath and buy LTC insurance than poorer individuals. Wealth, income, and bequest motives are all related to the elderly individual's budget set. Lockwood (2018 ) shows that bequest motives reduce the opportunity cost of saving, thus increasing savings and decreasing the demand not only for annuities (see Brown and Poterba 2000 ; Vidal-Melia and Lejarraga-Garcia 2006 ) but also for LTC insurance (see Glenzer and Achou 2019 on the bundled supply of annuities and LTC insurance). The effect of bequest motives on the demand for LTC insurance is not trivial because it depends on the wealth elasticity of bequests. Individuals may prefer to set aside precautionary savings as a means of self-insuring against LTC expenses. In most cases, these substantial savings will not be needed to pay for LTC services and will thus signifi cantly increase the bequest. It follows that, when risk aversion over bequests is low ( Auten and Joulfaian 1996 ; Hurd and Smith 2002 ) , LTC insurance is not attractive, especially in light of the premium loadings, which further reduce bequests and the value of LTC insurance.
One last demand-side source to explain the thinness of the LTC insurance market is the agents' misperception of such risk. This misperception occurs with respect to both the cost associated with LTC services and the likelihood that one will need such services. Finkelstein (2009 ) and Cremer, De Donder, and Pestieau (2009 ) mention individuals' misperceptions of LTC risks as the primary reason for the LTC puzzle. As with Finkelstein and McGarry (2006 ) , their conclusions are built on a survey that compared a respondent's subjective probability of entering a nursing home in the next fi ve years with his or her actual use fi ve years later. Because most respondents underestimate their true probability of needing LTC services, Finkelstein and McGarry infer that such under-assessment is the main reason why people do not purchase LTC insurance. Tennyson and Yang (2014 ) highlight the role of one's experience with LTC as a contributing factor to the awareness of the risk of LTC costs or the lack thereof (see also Zhou-Richter, Browne, and Gründl 2010 ) . In comparison with the reliance on informal care and with an individual's low risk aversion to bequest risk, misperception of risk and misperception of costs are arguably stronger justifi cations for policy intervention.
Approach
The objective of this article is to use a survey conducted in autumn 2016 to investigate the source of the low LTC insurance take-up and solve the so-called LTC insurance puzzle. To that end, we explore many aforementioned demand-side factors, such as the misperception of risks associated with old age and other individual characteristics (family support, risk aversion, wealth, and bequest motives), and supply-side factors, including the crowding out by public provision of similar services.
Our survey is closely related to that of Ameriks et al. (2016 ) , which examines the characteristics of demand for LTC insurance in the United States. With the help of Asking Canadians, a Canadian online panel survey organization, we conducted our survey using many questions similar to those in Ameriks et al. We asked questions about respondents' personal characteristics and preferences related to risk, their interest in leaving a bequest, and their knowledge of LTC services and LTC insurance. Ameriks et al. conclude that 60 percent of Americans should buy LTC insurance, although merely 22 percent of them actually have LTC insurance. In our Canadian panel, we fi nd a smaller potential market and a smaller take-up rate; 11 percent of our respondents tell us they have LTC insurance coverage. Ameriks et al. explains the gap between their theoretical prediction (60 percent) and reality (22 percent) as a lack of interest on the demand side as well as poor insurance product features.
Before getting into the possible reasons why so little LTC insurance is purchased, we first present the situation and the challenges that befall Canada with respect to the growing elderly population and the need for LTC services. In the "Why So Little Insurance" section, we present the survey we conducted on LTC insurance. We first examine demand-side explanations, such as risk aversion, risk perception, and wealth, and then examine supply-side explanations, including the crowding-out by government programs. In the final section, we conclude with the public policy implications of our results.
State of Long-Term Care in Canada
Despite the demographic trend toward an older population and the pressure it puts on health care costs at older ages, OECD countries have still been able to keep LTC expenditures (either public or private) relatively low. Overall, spending on LTC services in OECD countries averages 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), of which only 20 percent can be considered private expenditures. Figure 1 illustrates the importance of total LTC expenditures in 31 countries as a percentage of their GDP. Canada is close to the OECD average. Note: LTC = long-term care.
a Greb et al. (1994 ) . Source: McGregor and Ronald (2011 ) and Greb et al. (1994) .
Because the Canada Health Act (Canada 1985) does not include LTC services in dedicated establishments, provinces are not required to provide such services on a universal basis. Without any federally mandated standards, 9 LTC services can vary not only across provinces but also within a province on the basis of an individual's ability to pay or the type of services needed or available.
Insurance payments are not necessarily conditional on using formal LTC facilities (such as nursing homes, inter alia ) because policyholders can be allowed to use insurance benefits to compensate family members for the informal help they provide. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the extent of disparities across provinces in the provision of LTC services; Table 1 provides the out-of-pocket costs for individuals needing residential care, and Table 2 provides statistics on the availability of beds in residential care facilities and on the importance of the for-profi t sector in the provision of LTC services.
Across Canada, the maximum daily copayment for a stay in a residential care facility in 2005 varied from almost $200 in Nova Scotia to $40 in Alberta. Some provinces (Alberta, Ontario, and Newfoundland and Labrador) asked all residents to pay the same price for a basic service stay in a residential care facility. Other provinces used some form of means-testing approach or had different prices for different individuals based on their age or the type of services required or demanded (such as a private room). 10 The higher bound seems relatively low compared with the monthly earnings of richer retirees.
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In Ontario, the basic service monthly cost for any elderly individual in a residential care facility is $1,820. The maximum cost in Atlantic Canada varies between two and four times the minimum price. Table 2 shows that the supply of LTC facilities varies across provinces, in terms of both the number of available beds as a proportion of the population and the importance of for-profi t care facilities in the provinces (especially with respect to the Greb et al. 1994 fi ndings) . With respect to number of beds, New Brunswick has the smallest supply with 78.5 beds per 1,000 individuals aged 75 years and older, compared with 116.1 beds per 1,000 in Manitoba ( CUPE 2009 , cited in McGregor and Ronald 2011 ) . The private sector's presence is also quite different across provinces; it represents less than 10 percent of the total supply of beds in Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador, compared with 31 percent in British Columbia, 30 percent in Alberta and Nova Scotia, and 53 percent in Ontario. The important differences in the market share of for-profi t facilities between the Greb et al. Using OECD countries, Boyer (2018 ) shows that Canada is not unique in its treatment of LTC at the regional level; Slovakia and Estonia also have regional mandates for LTC services. In Spain, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Italy, and New Zealand, the responsibility for providing LTC services is shared between the central government and their more or less autonomous regions. In the United States, Medicare and Medicaid programs provide means-tested LTC services that are managed at the federal and state levels. What is unique about Canada is that it is the only OECD country in which the LTC responsibility falls entirely on the different regions (i.e., the provinces) while at the same time allowing a private LTC insurance market to operate. The LTC insurance puzzle is arguably less intense in Canada than in the United States because of public policy differences. In particular, Canadian provinces offer subsidized nursing home services, in contrast to U.S. states. Also, although in the United States Medicaid will pay for LTC only for people with low income and low assets, means-testing in Canada often considers only income, except in Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador, where assets are somewhat included, according to Blomqvist and Busby (2014 ) . The combination of Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement available to most Canadian seniors is suffi cient to cover basic public-supported LTC services at the means-tested rate.
Why So Little Insurance?
The Survey
We contacted a Canadian online panel survey organization, Asking Canadians, to conduct a survey on LTC insurance in late autumn 2016 using 2,000 panel members aged 50-70 years residing in either Ontario or Quebec.
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We chose this age range because these individuals are those for whom the risk of needing LTC is most salient and foreseeable but still idiosyncratic enough for insurers to see the risk as diversifi able, at least over time (similar to life insurance). Because some socio-demographic groups are underrepresented in the survey (in particular, the group of less-educated individuals), we re-weighed the data using the 2014 Labor Force Survey by stratifying groups on the basis of age (20 categories), sex (2 categories), province of residence (2 categories), and level of education (3 categories).
Available in French and English, the survey questionnaire had four parts. The first three parts asked respondents about their socio-economic characteristics, reasons for having purchased LTC insurance (or not), risk perceptions, and the type of LTC service they would prefer. Questions for which we expected a signifi cant fraction of missing information, such as measures of savings and income, were asked using unfolding brackets. We then imputed missing values with information from the bracketing on the basis of socio-demographic covariates. The fourth and last part of the survey, which we do not use in this article (see Boyer et al. 2017 for more details), consisted of a stated-preference experiment using the framework developed by Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010 ) , in which respondents were presented randomized LTC insurance contracts and asked how likely they would be to purchase this product. Table 3 reports the weighted summary statistics of some survey results. With respect to unweighted results (not reported), 50 percent of our respondents are residents of Quebec, are women, or are aged 60 years or older. Approximately the same proportion of respondents use French as their main language at home or are retired. With respect to their health, 44 percent reported having or having had at least one of the following seven medical conditions: heart disease, stroke, diabetes, lung disease, hypertension, mental health problems (including depression), and cancer. Of those with an illness, 72 percent reported having only one condition, 20 percent reported having two conditions, and 8 percent having three or more conditions.
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The fi rst result in Table 3 indicates that LTC insurance is not very popular; only 10.8 percent of survey participants report having some sort of LTC insurance coverage. This compares with 70 percent of respondents who have life insurance. The 10.8 percent LTC insurance take-up rate is not as small as one would think, however. Boyer et al. (2017 , 2) state that, in Quebec, "The association representing insurers (CLHIA) reported a take-up rate for LTC insurance policies around 1.7 percent in 2015." For Canada as a whole, CLHIA (2014 , 8) writes that "as of 2010, there were only about 385,000 Canadians with long-term care coverage," which, given a total of 4.8 million Canadians (Statistics Canada 2018) aged 65 years or older, gives a penetration rate of 8 percent .
14 Baker (2009 , as cited in Grignon and Bernier 2012 ) also fi nds a take-up rate of less than 1 percent. Our survey results are much closer to the 13.8 percent take-up rate in the United States reported in Brown and Finkelstein (2011 ) , but not as high as the 22 percent take-up rate reported in Ameriks et al. (2016 ) .
The median annual household income stands at $74,000. It is slightly below the median income of Canadian households, which stands at $79,000, but equal to the median income of Quebec households. Of our respondents, 54.7 percent report having an employersponsored pension plan. Conditional on reporting coverage and a premium greater than $1 (some respondents said they had insurance but refused to give the premium, coverage, or both), the average monthly premium is $122, for an average monthly benefi t of $2,377. Both values are in line with what is observed in the actual LTC insurance market. Because we seek to fi nd the reason why LTC insurance products are not more prevalent, in the remainder of the article we consider four "usual suspects"-two from the demand side and two from the supply side. Even though there are potentially other reasons (such as a lack of confi dence in the insurance industry) why LTC insurance markets fi nd little traction in Canada and in other OECD regions or countries, the following are the most likely:
1. LTC insurance is too expensive given the individual's perception of the risk associated with this type of adverse event. 2. Individuals' characteristics (such as risk aversion and wealth) are such that they have a low demand or need for LTC insurance. 3. The supply is lacking because insurers do not see much profi t to be made in this market or because commissions paid to insurance agents are too small to warrant investing much energy in selling LTC insurance products. 4. Public services are crowding out the private sector either directly by offering LTC services or indirectly by causing disruptions that reduce insurers' ability to diversify risk or to recoup the fi xed costs associated with introducing and maintaining such products.
Price and Risk Perceptions
We asked survey respondents for the basic pricing characteristics of their LTC insurance contracts. The median monthly LTC insurance premium is $85, which is lower than the mean of $122 (see Table 3 ). Monthly average insurance benefi ts are equal to $2,377. Similar to premiums, the mean benefi t is greater than the median benefi t, which is $1,974. Assuming a fi ve-year average need for LTC services (see Boisclair et al. 2016 ) , the average potential benefi t is close to $145,000, which is similar to the $150,000 that was reported in Grignon and Bernier (2012 ) for each member of a married couple. The monthly premium of $122 (or close to $1,500 per year) is quite similar to the cost of automobile insurance. It is therefore diffi cult to argue that most people do not have LTC insurance because it is too expensive. Still, individuals may have a low demand for insurance if they underestimate their probability of needing care so that the perceived price of insurance is too high. To investigate this possibility, we asked respondents for their subjective probability of needing nursing home care and of living more than one, two, or four years with one or more physical or mental (or ADL) limitations. Respondents' answers to these questions are compiled in Table 4 .
Examining fi rst the respondents' perceptions of risks and the actual probability of the event occurring, we see that uninsured respondents overestimate their probability of needing a nursing home, whereas insured respondents provide estimates that are quite close to their objective probability. The fact that uninsured individuals perceive their risk of needing LTC as being greater than that of insured individuals is contrary to what we know about the demand for insurance products. Consequently, the differences in respondents' perception of facing hardship later in life do not match the differences in LTC insurance purchasing decisions.
The difference between insured and uninsured respondents in the distribution of the perceived probability of needing a nursing home is more evident in Figure 2a , where we merged probabilities in 20 percent bins. Insured respondents (on the right) more commonly assign a low Note: The fi ve questions relate to the respondents' subjective probability of needing LTC. In all cases, we can reject the hypothesis that insured individuals are more pessimistic than uninsured individuals. Although 35-40 percent is the standard value range obtained from Johnson, Toohey, and Wiener (2007 ) , Robinson (1996 ) , and Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy (1994 ) , the recent estimate reported in Boyer et al. (2017 ) is 56 percent. The estimates in Hurd et al. (2013 ) and Friedberg et al. (2014 ) are also close to 50 percent. Kemper and Murtaugh (1991 ) propose 43 percent, whereas Wiener, Illston, and Hanley (1994 ; Wiener, Tilly, and Goldenson 2000 ) report 49 percent. Quoted in Dwyer (2016) , a senior executive of the CLHIA said that the probability that any Canadian will need LTC at least once in his or her lifetime is 17 percent. ADL = activity of daily living; LTC = long term care; N/A = not applicable; n.s. = non-signifi cant.
a Actual fi gure according to Boisclair et al. (2016 ) .
b Level of signifi cance of the test for the difference between the mean and median answers of those who believe they have LTC insurance coverage and those who have no insurance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels or a difference that is n.s. The test for the difference between the means is a t -test; for medians, it is a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. chance of needing a nursing home than uninsured respondents. We thus infer that insured respondents are not more pessimistic about the risk of needing LTC services because either insured and uninsured respondents have a similar estimation of the risk (probability of living to age 85 years, of living more than four years with an ADL limitation, or of living with a family member in need of a nursing home) or insured respondents have a lower subjective probability of needing a nursing home or of living more than one or two years with an ADL limitation. Boyer et al. (2019 ) show that uninsured individuals are more pessimistic than insured individuals even after controlling for possible covariates and characteristics associated with risk aversion and fi nancial literacy. Figure 2b shows that the perceived probability of ever needing a nursing home does not vary by sex. This perceived probability does, however, depend on the respondent's province of residence (see Figure 2c ) , with Quebec residents perceiving their risk of needing a nursing home as less than Ontario residents' risk. The only demographic variable that is signifi cantly correlated with one's subjective probability of needing LTC services is whether high school was completed (see Figure 2d ). The fi gure shows that, compared with respondents who did not fi nish high school, high school graduates perceive their probability of living in a nursing home to be signifi cantly higher. The link between education and LTC risk perception is not linear, however, because we fi nd no signifi cant relationship between the respondents' risk perception and different post-high school education levels. Irrespective of one's optimistic or pessimistic views on life, less-educated individuals could actually have a higher risk of dying before needing LTC services. Table 5 presents the reported values for the monthly mean individual cost of (or, equivalently, the net fee for) an unsubsidized private LTC home and a subsidized one. Uninsured Quebec respondents believe the monthly cost of an unsubsidized private nursing home to be higher than do those who have LTC coverage. Uninsured respondents perceive the cost of an unsubsidized nursing home to be more than three times the insured respondents' perception while at the same time believing subsidized nursing homes to be less costly. Ontario residents perceive the monthly cost of a subsidized nursing home to be greater than do Quebec residents. Uninsured Ontario respondents are more pessimistic in terms of the monthly cost of a nursing home than insured respondents by about $830. In Quebec, uninsured respondents are less pessimistic than the insured respondents.
Both insured and uninsured respondents in both provinces perceive the median waiting time for a room in a LTC facility as between 13 and 14 months (results not shown). This perception is pessimistic compared with reality; the actual median waiting time is approximately 3.5 months in Ontario and 10 months in Quebec (Commissaire à la santé et au bien-être 2017; Wait Time Alliance 2015). We conclude that the reason for the low take-up of LTC insurance does not seem to be that non-covered individuals underestimate their probability of needing LTC or the cost of LTC services or that LTC insurance is especially expensive compared with other types of insurance. The rationale for the low take-up must then lie elsewhere on the demand side, be a supply-side issue, or both.
Demand Characteristics Unrelated to Risk Perceptions
In addition to price and risk perceptions, we explore four other aspects of the demand for LTC insurance in Canada:
1. Respondents' risk aversion (higher risk aversion increases the demand for LTC insurance); 2. Whether LTC insurance is part of an employerprovided protection portfolio; 3. Role of health condition; and 4. Role of wealth and the presence of bequest motives.
Risk Aversion
If LTC insurance is similar to other types of insurance products, then, all else equal, we should expect more risk-averse agents to more likely be insured. In our survey, we asked only one direct question to tease out each respondent's attitude toward risk. More precisely, we asked whether respondents would be willing to take substantial, above average, average, or under average fi nancial risks to obtain substantial, above average, average, or under average fi nancial returns. Our presumption is that more risk-averse agents in capital market investing should also be more risk averse in seeking insurance protection. 15 The fi rst result of Table 6 shows that insured respondents are signifi cantly more willing to take above-average fi nancial risks (23.7 percent versus 19.2 percent), which means that (fi nancial) risk aversion does not positively correlate with the demand for LTC insurance.
In addition to this direct question, we report in Table  5 some individual characteristics (age, sex, education, marital status, number of children) associated with risk aversion (see Halek and Eisenhauer 2001 ), which we cross-tabulate with having LTC insurance coverage (on the right) or not (on the left). Older individuals and women are thus deemed more risk averse. 16 Married individuals can also be seen as being able to support more risk because it will be borne by two individuals, not a single one, although individuals could get married because they are risk averse (see Halek and Eisenhauer 2001 for that argument).
The last two rows of Table 5 address the willingness to leave a bequest or, when appropriate, the feeling that children can also bear part of the respondent's LTC risk, so having children implies a higher tolerance for LTC risk.
Uninsured respondents are on average 1.5 years older than insured respondents. At the same time, women are more likely to be uninsured than men because they represent more than half of the uninsured respondents but only one-third of the respondents who reported being covered by some sort of LTC insurance. Individuals who reported having some type of LTC insurance coverage are not statistically more likely to have completed high school. With respect to marital status, individuals who are living with a partner are proportionally more likely to have LTC insurance. Last, having at least one child is not signifi cantly associated with insurance coverage.
17 None of these results offers any support to the hypothesis that risk aversion is a determining factor in whether one has LTC insurance.
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Collective Insurance
We now investigate whether respondents' reports of LTC coverage related to their report of having other insurance products. For instance, respondents may believe that such coverage is part of their employer's (or their former employer's) pension plan system or that it is a component of their spouse's collective insurance agreement. 19 To examine this hypothesis, we asked respondents what type of pension plan their employer offered. Table 7 gives a breakdown of the respondents' answers to some of our survey's relevant questions, with an emphasis on whether they have (or believe they have) LTC insurance and, if not, why. Moreover, we asked them about their level of knowledge of LTC insurance.
In the case in which respondents declare that they have no LTC insurance coverage, we defi ne as the untapped demand that associated with respondents who, when asked why they had no LTC coverage, answered either that they did not know what it was or that they were never offered this type of coverage by any insurance company representative or fi nancial planner. Half of the respondents who declared that they had no LTC insurance can be classifi ed as part of the untapped demand group of individuals.
Respondents who refused LTC insurance responded to the question of why they did not have LTC insurance. Possible answers were that they thought it was too expensive, that they did not need it (say, because they are suffi ciently wealthy to self-insure), or that the coverage offered did not meet their needs. Finally, we also looked at the proportion of respondents whose coverage has lapsed or whose application was denied. The omitted answer categories are those of respondents who were still waiting for an answer from the insurance company or who had not yet decided whether they needed such insurance coverage. Conditional on being part of the untapped demand for LTC insurance, or conditional on being part of the group of respondents who believe they have LTC insurance but did not choose to buy it (i.e., it came with the job or spouse's coverage or is part of a group benefi t), we divided the respondents on the basis of whether they had access to a pension plan (either defi ned benefi t [DB] or defi ned contribution [DC]) or not. We hypothesize that LTC insurance is more likely to be offered as part of a portfolio of insurance protection that includes having an employer-sponsored pension plan.
Among individuals who believe they are covered by some sort of LTC insurance, close to 70 percent answered that they had access to some sort of employer-provided pension plan. This contrasts with those individuals whose demand for LTC insurance remains untapped, of whom only 57 percent report having access to some employerprovided pension plan. Examining the likelihood of having access to a DB plan conditional on any pension plan being offered by the employer, we fi nd no statistical difference between individuals who believe they are covered and those whose demand is untapped. It therefore seems that merely having access to an employer-provided pension plan is suffi cient for increasing the likelihood that an individual will have LTC insurance coverage. 20 This suggests that transaction and search costs matter.
Health
With respect to respondents' health conditions, recall from Table 3 that 44 percent of respondents reported having or having had at least one of the following seven medical conditions: heart disease, stroke, diabetes, lung disease, hypertension, mental health problems, or cancer. To control for the impact of medical condition on the purchase of LTC insurance, respondents were separated on the basis of whether they had life insurance in addition to having LTC insurance. We could thus classify survey participants into four categories, depending on whether they have LTC insurance only, life insurance only, both, or neither. Table 8 presents how the incidence of chronic conditions differs across respondents depending on their category.
The different t -tests indicate that there are no significant differences with respect to the respondents' likelihood of having any chronic conditions across the four groups. Hence, respondents' health condition does not seem to be a good explanation for differences in the demand for LTC insurance. 21 One possible explanation for the low to no correlation between health condition and having LTC insurance is that LTC insurers are aware of the health condition and set rates accordingly. In a Canadian context, recent legislation reducing insurers' ability to price insurance contracts on the basis of medical or genetic conditions may change this result in the future because insurers should no longer be able to know of an individual's health condition (McCaffery 2017) .
We could be witnessing the impact of two contradicting forces. First, healthier individuals are more likely to be able to buy LTC insurance because sickly individuals would be denied insurance. Second, individuals with bad Note: The table decomposes the respondents' answers to our survey as a function of whether they believe they have some sort of LTC insurance and what motivated them to be in that situation. Of the initial 2,000 respondents, 1,819 gave us a yes-or-no answer to whether they have LTC insurance coverage. Percentages do not add to 100 because of omitted or missing answers. DB = defi ned benefi t; DC = defi ned contribution; LTC = long-term care.
health early in life could have a greater chance of dying early so that they would not need to buy LTC insurance. Those two opposing forces could make it such that there would be no aggregate difference in respondents' health conditions across the four sub-samples, although there are differences at the individual level.
Wealth
We investigate one last dimension to explain LTC insurance demand: respondents' ability to pay for LTC services themselves. We therefore examine how income and wealth (defi ned as the sum of the respondent's reported total fi nancial savings and house value) have an impact on the demand for LTC insurance. With wealthier individuals being able to self-insure and poorer individuals not having enough income to afford LTC insurance, it is not clear that income and wealth should have any aggregate impact on the probability of having LTC insurance. Table 9 gives wealth and other personal characteristics of the respondents (whether they are retired, have access Note: N = 1,803. Conditional on giving a valid answer to whether they own LTC insurance, life insurance, or both, this table presents the proportion of respondents who said they have one of seven chronic conditions as a function of their insurance portfolio. t -tests on the proportion of respondents who have any condition suggest that the probability that respondents are affl icted by at least one condition does not vary signifi cantly across insurance portfolio categories. LTC = long-term care.
Source: Authors' calculations. Note: Percentages may total more than 100 because of rounding. LTC = long-term care.
a Proportion of respondents who own their house and its median value.
b Median total savings (including housing).
c Proportions of respondents who consider themselves retired, who have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan, and agree or strongly agree that leaving a bequest is important.
Source: Authors' calculations.
to a employer-provided pension, and want to leave a bequest) according to three income brackets (income > $100,000, income < $50,000, and income in between) and whether they have LTC insurance or not. The most striking difference between insured and uninsured respondents is that uninsured individuals are more likely to be in the lowest income bracket: 33 percent of uninsured respondents earn less than $50,000 a year, compared with 21 percent of insured respondents. Conditional on having a low income, uninsured respondents are less likely to own a house, but conditional on owning it, their house's value, net of the mortgage, is greater. In addition, uninsured individuals' median total wealth is greater than that of the insured individuals. The combined differences in income and wealth at the lower end of the distribution of income may be due to the fact that uninsured individuals are more likely to consider themselves as retired, which would corroborate an earlier result that uninsured individuals are, on average, older by 1.5 years than the entire sample and by more than 2 years for the subsample of lower earning respondents.
For middle-income-bracket respondents (whose current income is between $50,000 and $100,000), we note that uninsured respondents are as wealthy as insured respondents, even though they are less likely to be covered by an employer-provided pension plan. Their opinion as to the importance of leaving a bequest is not that different from that of insured individuals. Last, the only difference we observe between the answers of higher-income-bracket individuals and those in other income brackets seems to be with respect to the likelihood of being retired. Insured individuals in the higher income bracket are more likely to consider themselves as being retired (46 percent) than uninsured individuals in the same income bracket (40 percent). In the two lower income brackets (households earning less than 100,000 dollars), the opposite is observed because insured individuals are less likely to be retired than uninsured individuals. 22 In addition, among individuals whose income is below 100,000 dollars, the likelihood of having access to an employer-provided pension plans is 15 percentage points higher for individuals with LTC insurance than for uninsured individuals.
With respect to the bequest motive, we note that respondents whose income is less than $50,000 and who intend to leave a bequest are most correlated with the purchase of LTC insurance, with 18.4 percent of uninsured low-income respondents feeling that bequests are important compared with 45.5 percent of insured low-income respondents. It thus seems that the demand for LTC insurance is related to the wealth elasticity of bequests. Prior evidence (see Auten and Joulfaian 1996 ) shows that a retiree's risk aversion over bequests is not suffi cient to make them purchase LTC insurance. Moreover, Hurd and Smith (2002 ) show that households in the 70-74 age bracket intend to bequeath merely 39 percent of their wealth; this suggests that many retirees prefer setting aside precautionary savings as a means of self-insuring against the cost of LTC ( Lockwood 2018 ) . Because these savings will not be needed to cover the cost of LTC, however, an unintended bequest will occur. In a sense, heirs are bearing their parents' LTC cost risk.
Summary of Demand Characteristics
To sum up, there is little evidence that reporting having LTC insurance is correlated with risk aversion or health. There is, however, some evidence that having LTC insurance is positively correlated with having an employer-sponsored pension plan and, for low-income individuals, not yet being retired and having a bequest motive. Because these demand-side fi ndings seem insufficient to explain the low penetration of LTC insurance, we now turn our attention to supply-side explanations.
Supply Characteristics: Cost of Underwriting, Adverse Selection, and Lapse Risk
The supply-side explanations we propose differ from those presented in Brown and Finkelstein (2004 ) . They write that on the supply side, four market problems have been suggested as potential explanations for the small size of the market . . . : high transaction costs, imperfect competition, and asymmetric information (either adverse selection or moral hazard), [and] the uninsured aggregate risk of rising long-term care costs. 23 Cutler (1996 ) adds the possibility that LTC insurance provides ineffi cient coverage because of information acquisition cost and lapse risk. Although transaction costs may play a role in the Canadian LTC insurance market, our explanation focuses mostly on the lack of information provided to individuals and on governments crowding out the private market.
On the basis of the same survey used in this article, Boyer et al. (2017 ) show that adverse selection is not an important problem in LTC insurance in Canada. The reason rests in the long-term nature of the risk such that no individual has better information than insurers about his or her risk of needing nursing home services in 15-20 years. Boyer et al. estimate that the adverse selection problem generates welfare cost of $2 per year per person.
Looking back at Table 7 , we note that 50.7 percent of uninsured respondents mentioned not knowing that LTC insurance products even existed. Moreover, of the 39 percent of respondents who refused to purchase such a product, 27.9 percent reported a level of knowledge about the product equivalent to none. This 27.9 percent of uninsured individuals who refused the insurance despite knowing nothing about it can be contrasted with the 3.7 percent of individuals who have LTC insurance and whose level of knowledge about the product is none. This means that more than 60 percent of uninsured individuals are characterized by very low knowledge of the product. It is natural to think that they would have a higher probability of opting to be covered had they been better informed. At the same time, the higher LTC insurance take-up by those with a pension plan does suggest that transaction costs are a factor.
In Table 10 , we compare the average characteristics of uninformed uninsured individuals-either because they never were offered LTC insurance (e.g., by a fi nancial advisor) or because they did not know what it was-with the characteristics of those who knew what a LTC insurance contract was-either because they owned one or answered that they knew what it was.
We note that informed respondents are generally younger, reside in Quebec, and are in better health than uninformed respondents. 24 The proportions of women, retirees, and married respondents do not differ across the two categories. The same can be said about income and total assets and about home ownership and access to a pension plan (results not shown).
With respect to the insured respondents in particular, they reported that the main reason for purchasing LTC insurance was that it was offered to them. Only 9.6 percent declared that they had actively searched for such protection. This means that LTC insurance is more likely a "push product" in the sense that it is not naturally purchased by consumers but has to be explained and sold to them. Because individual insurance companies do not seem to have enough private incentives to increase the LTC insurance take-up rate, the apparent need for an intensive information campaign could possibly be provided by some para-governmental entity or an industry task force.
Another possible supply-side explanation is that the sales force necessary to distribute LTC insurance in the Canadian population is not informed enough about the benefi ts of such a product or they feel that they are not compensated enough to invest time and resources in learning how LTC insurance products work. Although we have no direct evidence, an executive from Munich Reinsurance was quoted as saying, Sales for this niche product [LTC insurance] have been stagnating despite 20 years of efforts in promoting it . . . Sales were not there. Their growth was weak, just as much at the sales. Force interest in the product.
25
One last direct supply-side explanation has to do with lapse risk. In our context, lapse risk is defi ned as good risks dropping their coverage as time passes and bad risks continuing to pay for the protection. One can think of this as ex post adverse selection ( ex ante adverse selection occurs when market participants have private information at contract initiation). When agents learn more about their health status as time passes, good risks end up paying too much for the protection. As a result, good risks are more likely to let their policy lapse so that only the bad risks are left in the pool. Given the survey we conducted, it is impossible for us to assess whether what we could call adverse selection lapse risk is enough of a phenomenon in general to lead to the entire collapse of the LTC insurance market.
Who Are the Guilty Parties? Conclusion and Public Policy Implications
Similar to the epigraph related to detective movies that began this article, we are at the point where, in a parlor room-type scene, we now reveal who we feel is the real culprit for the low LTC insurance coverage in Canada. We examined many reasons why the market for LTC insurance in Canada is so small. More precisely, we investigated whether the reasons for the low take-up rate lie on the demand side of the market, including risk perceptions, or on the supply side, including whether the government crowds out the private insurance sector.
Extending LTC insurance coverage to the entire Canadian population (through, say, a change in the Canada Health Act ) was proposed by Grignon and Bernier (2012 ) and Grignon (2016 ) . Although one could argue that this is already the case, it comes with a "time deductible" in the sense that one must be willing to wait a number of months before obtaining a spot in a nursing facility. In particular, Grignon and Bernier argue that the best possible solution to the challenges of providing adequate LTC services to a growing elderly population is through the public provision of LTC services because (a) individuals are misinformed about LTC needs or in denial of the risk they face, (b) between 25 percent and 70 percent of individuals cannot afford insurance, and (c) there are important market failures (such as lapse and systemic risk, which reduce coverage and increase loading fees) in the LTC insurance market. The analysis we provide in this article does not support such policy because we fi nd that (a) there are no differences in the risk perceptions of insured and uninsured individuals, (b) the cost of purchasing LTC insurance is not high considering the household incomes of our survey respondents, and (c) asymmetric informationbased market failures (including adverse selection) are not that important. We also note that pension plans also suffer from systemic risk, if not more so than LTC insurers, and yet they are much more signifi cant.
Using a survey of Canadians aged 50-70 years living in Quebec and Ontario, we conclude on the basis of survey responses that erroneous risk perceptions and other demand characteristics are not the main drivers of the low penetration of LTC insurance. Because purchasers and non-purchasers of LTC insurance have essentially the same risk perceptions and the same personal characteristics, it is diffi cult to argue that these should be the determinants of the low penetration. We believe that we are not missing some personal characteristics that correlate with the demand for LTC insurance because we asked a very large (albeit non-exhaustive) set of questions, all related to the explanations proposed by the literature on the LTC puzzle. Another often-cited source of market failure can also be ruled out: adverse selection. Individual respondents to our survey who purchased LTC insurance do not appear to have a higher expectation of needing it than non-purchasers. Adverse selection is thus likely marginal in the Canadian LTC insurance market, despite Manulife's recent announcement that restrictive rules regarding the use of an individual's medical information in insurance underwriting have exacerbated the private LTC insurance supply-side problems. The limited market acceptance of such products is more likely to be a valid explanation for Manulife discontinuing the sale of LTC insurance. It would be quite surprising if individuals learn enough information through time for lapse risk to be much different across risk categories.
The most likely culprit for the low LTC insurance penetration in Canada (and possibly elsewhere in the world) must then reside in consumers' ignorance of these products, transaction costs, and crowding out by public policies. Consumer ignorance may, of course, be rational, if there is a cost to becoming informed, if there is a general perception that government programs are adequate, and if the perception is that the loading factor on LTC insurance policies (i.e., the direct transaction cost) is high. All of these reasons boil down to putting part of the blame on the supply of LTC insurance Given that merely 10 percent of individuals who have LTC insurance actively searched for such coverage and that more than 50 percent of uninsured individuals have never heard of such a product, the industry, as a whole, must bear part of the blame for consumers being unaware that these products exist. Although it is true that our survey was conducted only in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, there is no reason to believe that insurers elsewhere in Canada are any more innovative in their LTC insurance sales strategy.
In addition to consumers' lack of awareness, a second likely culprit for the low take-up rate of LTC insurance in Canada is the public system's provision of similar services. By subsidizing basic services in nursing homes, provincial governments are likely crowding out the private supply of LTC insurance. This crowding out is due not only to the subsidies that nursing homes receive but also to the structure of the Canadian pension system (such as the Canada Pension Plan, la Régie des rentes du Québec, the federal government's Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement), which offers promises of retirement income independent of any risk underwriting. Contributions to the Canadian pension system independent of one's risk may thus come at the possible cost of limiting the market of private LTC insurance (in addition to reducing private savings, as shown in Veall 1986 ). This may nonetheless be a small price to pay in the grand scheme of social protection.
If crowding out is the problem, but there is a need to retain some kind of government backstop, there is the possibility of lessening the population's reliance on it. To do so, three avenues appear to us. First, the federal government (or the provincial governments) could make the backstop less attractive by increasing waiting times or the number of patients per room to help create the need for a private LTC insurance market that would cover the wait period. Second, governments could subsidize, directly or indirectly, the acquisition of LTC insurance, perhaps through the tax system. 26 Finally, the government could use its heavy hand and make personal provision mandatory through an entity similar to the Canada Pension Plan or Régie des rentes du Québec because, as argued by Veall (1986 ) in a different context, public backstops lead to an ineffi cient amount of self-insurance, so compulsory purchase of some minimum level of LTC insurance would become mandatory.
So, what can be done to increase insurers' interest in offering LTC protection to Canadians? Assuming that crowding out remains, one candidate policy could simply be to better inform individuals about the risks of becoming dependent in old age, to better inform them about the costs associated with dependency, and to promote fi nancial knowledge. In this sense, our results echo Grignon and Bernier (2012 , 9) , who write, If lack of information . . . is the main cause of the low takeup rate of private long-term care insurance, governments could undertake to better inform the population [and] private insurance companies could launch advertising campaigns to convince consumers of the need to buy private long-term care insurance.
Another possibility, which is not currently provided by the private market, could reside in coupling LTC insurance with a life insurance benefi t to heirs in case of early death with no loss of autonomy. The government could also mandate that some minimum LTC insurance protection be linked to private pension or public pension benefi ts to eliminate adverse selection problems (if they exist) and thus decrease loading fees. For such solutions to make any sense, one must accept that a problem exists. Of course, it is also quite possible that there is no problem in this market and that private LTC insurance is already provided optimally, albeit to only 10 percent of the population in the age bracket in which such insurance can realistically be purchased. shows that even a more general survey question about respondents' risk attitude ("How willing are you to take risks, in general?") was a meaningful predictor of actual behavior in a real-stakes lottery (see Dohmen et al. 2011 ) . Nevertheless, psychological research suggests that risk aversion in different domains (fi nancial, recreational, etc.) can differ (e.g., Slovic 1972) . Kapteyn and Teppa (2011 ) show that ad hoc answers to questions about risk aversion have the most explanatory power for actual portfolio decisions. 16 Although it is true that Halek and Eisenhauer (2001 ) fi nd that risk aversion diminishes with age, this is true only for individuals who are younger than age 65 years. Individuals aged 65 or older are approximately twice as risk averse as individuals who are aged younger than 65 years. 17 The number of children is not signifi cant either once we remove the one respondent who reported having 23 kids (the mean number of kids then becomes 2.18 for the insured population compared with 2.12 for the uninsured population). 18 A multi-variate probit analysis tells the same story: Only age, being a woman, and being married are signifi cant in explaining having any LTC insurance coverage. 19 Our understanding of the LTC insurance market in Canada is that it essentially is never a part of the collective insurance package that is offered to employees and retirees or their family. In our survey, however, some respondents responded that they did not buy LTC insurance because, when asked in an open-ended question, such protection was part of their employer's or their spouse's employer's collective insurance package. 20 We tested (results not shown) for whether the correlation between LTC insurance and access to a pension was due to income or wealth. By comparing respondents who reported having LTC insurance and a pension plan with those who reported having neither, we fi nd no statistical difference in mean total income, mean total savings, mean house value, mean total income conditional on being retired (or not), or mean education level. The difference between the two samples is correlated with being a woman (more likely to have neither) and living in Quebec (more likely to have both). 21 We obtain similar results (no health difference across groups) when comparing those with and without LTC insurance, leaving life insurance aside. 22 When we run a probit analysis on whether the respondent has insurance or not, none of the income, asset, home ownership, and pension income variables are signifi cant. 23 Grignon and Bernier (2012 ) use the term systemic risk to refer to the uninsured aggregate risk. 24 Differences are qualitatively the same if we defi ne the informed as only those who are both uninsured and informed. 25 Loose translation of "Ce créneau stagnait, malgré plus de 20 ans de promotion du produit au Canada . .. Les ventes n'étaient pas au rendez-vous. Leur croissance demeurait faible, tout comme l'intérêt de la force de vente" (Cedric Thibault, directeur principal, développement des affaires, réassurance individuelle, Munich Reinsurance, quoted in Thériault 2018). 26 For instance, instead of focusing on the public provision of LTC insurance, another tool (in addition to those proposed in Adams and Vanin 2016 ) would be to offer tax credits or deductions to individuals who purchase LTC insurance. Unfortunately, given our study's fi ndings about individuals' lack of knowledge about LTC insurance, it is unlikely that tax credits would increase the level of information and thus the take-up rate of LTC insurance.
